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khIc&tion @&rmcrs In vduntaa bblbs?ctor cmp Insumnceprogmmmcs has historically been low. We 
a?k&t on8 MpwtPnt  dcNrminont sffmrrs' partidpation-the potential for crop insumncc to mduce household 
'irrcwnr wrlability, Based on dmulated crop insumnce designs carried out on household panel data, we find that 
crop insumnct is not df i t ive  In smoothing fluctuations in income. 
Tlkslmulation.mltspoint to some geneml conditions l o t  have to be sat@Ted ijcrop insumnce is to genehe 
~ b l e  rlrk k M t s .  We a ~ u e  that t h w  conditions are unlikely to be met in India's Semi-Arid %pits. What 
defwts m p  insumnce in drytand agricullm is a m  variability which is largely attributed to households respon- 
ding to miflail events. 
Because crop insumnce scores such low marks as an dfective stabilisation policy, midall lotteries and rum1 
public works are also evaluated. Both of these institutional alternatives could be or ate superior to crop insumnce 
as a means to mluce income variability for large numbers of rum1 households in India's Semi-Arid lhpics, 
IN a rkent issue of the EPW; Dandekar 
(1985) discussed in detail the workings of the 
pi ~t crop insurance schemes tested since 
1 b 9 in seen11 states of India. Dandekar 
a p m s e d  concern that farmers' participa- 
tion in the schemes lefts lot to be desired. 
Lack of farmer acceptance is not uniquC 
to the Indian pilot schemes, but is chanctcri- 
stic of voluntary public-sector crop insurance 
programmes including some that are sub- 
sidised much more heavily than the Indian 
pilot schemes (Nieuwoldt and Bullock 1985; 
Gardner and K m r  1986). In this paper, 
m argue that farmers are reluctant to par- 
ticipate because crop insurance is not effec- 
tive in protecting households from crop 
income -risk even in highly uncertain, 
dryland production environments typical of 
the Semi-Arid Tropics (SAT) w h m  yield risk 
is often an order of magnitude three to four 
times greater than price risk. 
The argument is b a d  on the modest and 
in most cases negligible risk benefits 
estimated from simulated crop insurance 
designs carried out on data from a 9-year 
household panel. Such da!a are a unique 
source of information to evaluate the con- 
sequences of different stabilisation policies 
on fluctuations in household income. The 
village study results point to some general 
principles or conditions that haw to be 
satisfied if crop insurance is to generate 
sizeable risk benefits. In particular, what 
defeats cr* Lsurance in dryland agriculture 
is area winbility which is lamely conditioned 
by households' mponse totl;e weather. 
Because crop insurance scores such low 
marks as an effective stab'iration policy, two 
institutional alternatives, rainfall lotteries 
and rural public works. an m i n e d  later 
i the paper. We believe that both of those 
tunrtives could be or arc superior to crop S 
insurance as a means to reduce income 
variability for large number of rural 
houschddr in India's SAT, 
Before address- risk benefits canccp- 
tually and emp~rically, we briefly review why 
risk benefits haw remained a neglected 
theme in the literature and how crop 
insurance has evolved as a policy in India. 
That knowledge is essential to following the 
reasoning in the rest of the paper which ends 
with a discussion of some economically 
questionable suggestions ohen made to sur- 
mount the problem of low farmer participa- 
tion in voluntary crop i n s m e  pmgrammcs. 
COST OF CROP INSURANCE 
The risk benefits of and the consequent 
demand for crop insurance has not attracted 
as much attention in the litmature as the cost 
of providing insurance. Concentrating 
mearch effort on the supply side is justified 
because the fundamental problem with 
public sector crop insurance is that the costs 
to the exchequer a n  potentially high and 
those of an ill-conceived programme can be 
catastrophic. The two developing countries 
that have invested most heavily in crop 
insurance are Mexico and Brazil. In 1981, 
the Maican government spent more than 
Rs 600 cron in subsidies on crop insurance 
that over time wolved into an income 
maintenance scheme for poor dryland ccrd  
and grain legume producers (Bassow, 
Carter, and Norton 1986). In that m e  yeor, 
indemnities paid to farmers approached 
Rs 300 crore in a federal crop insurance pro- 
gramme in Brazil (de Rczende Lopes and 
Leik de Silva Dias 1986h That programme 
paid out about 40 times more than it took 
In during its initial years of operation in 1975 
and 1976. 
Expenses on administration an oftm only 
a small component of total costs. Hidden 
costs an associated with moral hazard and 
adverse selection which chn be endemic in 
ill-designed crop insurance programmes. 
Moral hazard is anommous with farmers 
taking advantage- of -&knew in pro- 
gramme deign while adverse selection 
means that participants in the programme 
are not representative of the target popula- 
tion of interest. For example, farmers in the 
heavily subsidised Brazilian programme 
found it profitable to plant upland rice with 
grass seed and claim indemnities on the 
failed upland rice which was not harvested. 
They had their pasture established courtesy 
of the government's sub&& nop insurnncc 
programme (de Rerende Lopes and Leite de 
Silva Dias 1986). 
Farmers on more marginal land within a 
designated region have often been more 
likely to participate in crop insurance 
(Walker 1982). Better farmers are adversely 
selected against which inval~dates the basis 
for actuarial calculations in a voluntary 
crop insurance programme. Given the scope 
for moral hazard and adverse selection to 
manifest themselves. most practitioners 
recommend that pmgmmmes m l w  ova time 
after an initial phase of experimentation 
characterised by learning by doing. 
CROP INSURANCE IN INDIA 
With regard to crop insurance, India has 
done better than most countries for two 
muons: (I) the public sector h u  not imated 
that much in crop insma and (2) wha- 
investment that has been made haa been 
allocated to schemes that, for the most part. 
were financially sound. 
The recent history of crop insurance in 
India is chronicled in Dandekar (1976), 
Agarwal(1980) and Dandekar (1985). That 
history is marked by the following events: 
(1) In 1965, the Centre proposed a Model 
Crop Insurance Scheme. 
(2) The state governments refused to par- 
ticipate in that scheme without substan- 
tial subsidisation by the Centre 
(3) In 1971, an Expert Committee was 
formed to evaluate the Model Scheme. 
It decided against crop insurance. 
(4) In 1972. an experimental crop insurance 
scheme was established to promote 
ud Pdd4d W a W r  Val XXI Nm .nA llr 
hybrld cotton pmduction in selected 
lrau of Guj~ypf.~ 
(5) In 1979-80, an innovative pilot. crop 
lnwnnce prognmm6 bahi  on a 
homogenebur 8m nther thrn .a in- 
dividual f u m a  rpprorch, don# the 
Uner suglcatal by Dandekrr (1976) w u  
Initiated by the Oamnment INUMCC 
Corporation and the state governments 
i n ~ u t u o f O u j a r a t ' I L m i l N a d u ,  
rad Wut Bend.  F t  prowamme w u  
aubaeqqeotly atpanded to other states 
and commodities om time. 
The pilot i ~ u r a n c e  schemes, started in 
1979, are finandally healthy because assess- 
lag prmia and especially indemnities on a 
homogeneous area apppach essentially 
eliminates problems of moral hazard and 
adwne selection (Dandehr, 1976). Loss 
ntior, indemnities paid divided by premia 
collected, have only aceedcd 1.0 in relatively 
few states, crops, seasons, and years 
(Dandeku, 1985). Data in Dandekar's com- 
prehensive Appendix 'Rbles (pp A-57 and 
A-58) indicate that over five cropping years 
from 1979-80 to 1983-84 the total loss ratio 
was a respectable 1.10. Administrative costs 
qrc rlso lesr in a homogm#nu area approach. 
fbndd W t h  of the iruunr doer not 
mnrlrte into putidpation by fumen. Hre 
now turn to a n r l y ~  r c ~ ~ n s  for low farmer 
partidpation. 
RISK BENEFITS CONCEPTUALLY 
SuWirrdon polides like crop insurance 
cm bmdit  producer^ in two way& They can 
incrwe mean incame levels or nduce 
income variability (Newbery and Stiglitz, 
1981). The f o m a  M refarad to re transfer 
benifits, while the latter arc usually called 
risk benefits.' 'Ruufer benefits arise largely 
from the level of programme subsidies and 
the degne of specidisation into riskier but 
more profitable technologies or crops as a 
mult of participation in the programme. 
'Rnnsfer benefits arc very location specific 
and depend on commodity supply and 
demand elasticities. They often wind up in 
the hands of consumers. 
Risk benefits of a stabilisation policy are 
identified with how much farmers would be 
willing to pay to smooth fluctuations in 
income and consumption. How much they 
would be willing to pay depends on their 
preferences for risk taking, on their percep- 
tions of how much participatioti in a crop 
Placing crop insurance on a sound finan- ins- programme would result in l e d  
cial footing is a wry large achievement, but household income variability, and on their 
TABLE 1: AQROCLIMATIC, SOCIO-ECONOMIC, ANDTBCHNOUXJICAL FE TURBS OF THREE INDIAN SAT 
VlLLMES FROM 1975-76 TO 1983-84 
VilWe (Redon. A w e  Irrigated Common lmproved 
District, Soils, Annual Size of Area (Per Crops 'Rchnologies 
Rainfall) Operational Cent Grosa Adopted 
Holding Cropped 
(Hectares) Area) 
Aufwdle CRhgrnr, 4.3 21.4 Irrigated paddy. HYV paddy, 
Mrhbubnw, Alfisoh, castor, romhum HYV castor, 
6-1 feniliser on 
irrigated land 
Shlmpur, (Bombay Decun, 4.8 9.4 Sorghum Pertiliser on 
Shohpur, deep nrtisoil:, irrigated land 
660 mm) 
K.mnn (Vidhubh.. Akola, 5.0 7.1 Cotton, Hybrid sorghum, 
m d u m  deep nrtisols. sorghum fertilirer. 
930 mm) inacctidde and 
mechanical 
threshing 
TABLE 2: D6SCRlPrlVE lNPORMATl0N ON THE COMMON CROPS SOWN IN THE STUDY VILLMES 
FROM 1975-76 TD 1983-84 
Number of Per cent Coefficient of ~a"a!ion 
-P Village Farm Mean of Gross (cv)** in Per Cent 
House- Cropped House- Yield Price 
holds* Cropped A m  hold 
Income 
lrri#atsd paddy Aunprlle 9 8.1 12 47 31 7 
Cutor Aureprlle 23 7.6 34 45 68 22 
Salhm knprl le  21 7.3 18 41 66 12 
Sorlbum Shinpur 21 8.3 58 34 69 17 
Cotton Kuuur 26 8.2 51 33 44 IS 
Hybrid w&um Kuuur I8 7.2 8 34 66 13 
Nofa  Those that vhtcd the sop for at least 5 years from 1975.76 to 1983-84. 
** Simple m e  acms~ those households that-planted ihe crop in at lurt 5 m n  from 
1975-76 10 1983.84. 
a t y ' c o a u s t t o & & k f l k ~ u ~ h ,  
d o n s  in credit and W t  nUrLcts :n 
changer in storage mib. If farmers \\e 
risk averse, if thtY m v c d  that cro 
ingurance could significantly redu 
household income VPtiabiiit~, If they cool 
not cost cfftctivdy adjust to income risk. H 
would expect than to pdc ipr te  in a cro 
insurance p r o g m ~ ~  providsd the pmnl 
costs wm not that lam 
In this paper, we focus On the second c 
the three components that condition pa 
ticipation, namely the perceived consc 
p u m a  from emlling in a stab'isation prc 
gramme, lib crop i n s u m  on hou~hol  
incame wdability. The conventional way t 
analyse variability consequences in th 
economics titeratun is to cornpan the we1 
ficient of variation (CV) of householc 
income with and without participation in th 
programme (Nmbery and Stifitz, 1981) 
Large risk benefits are obtained when th~ 
CV with simulated programme participatior 
is substantiallv lower than the actual CV. L 
contrast, when we impose different pro 
gramme designs on household incomc 
streams and arrive at little or no change if 
income CVs we have every reason to expec 
that the risk benefits from and the conse 
quent demand for an unsubsidised crop 
insurance programme will be negligible Fm 
farmers would invest in an unsubsidised 
stabilisation programme if they did not 
believe that participation would haw a 
measurable impact on dampening incomc 
variability. Before outlining the simulated 
crop insurance designs and quantifying their 
risk benefits, we describe the data base in 
the next section. 
VILLAGES, DATA, AND THE WEATHER 
We rely on longitudinal data from three 
villages which broadly reflect three soil, 
climatic, and cropping regions of India's 
Semi-Arid 'Ropics mble 1). Production risk 
is significantly greater in drought-prone 
Aurepalle and Shirapur than in rainfall- 
assured Kanzara. 
The institutional environment for risk ad- 
justment is also considerably different 
among the villages. Shirapur and Kanzara 
belong to Maharashtra State which has 
invested heavily in public works projects, 
most notably the Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (EGS). The EGS is active in both 
villages particularly in Shirapur.) Non- 
gwernmental off-farm wage earnings in ex- 
cavating and transporting sand for constmc- 
tion contractors have also been a substan- 
tial source of emplaymeat for labout market 
Participants from Shirapur. In Aurepalle in 
Mahbubnagar district of Andhra Pradesh, 
households do not have nearby access to a 
BoYmunent employer of last reson and the 
labour market is less buoyaat than in the 
Maharashtra villages. Households in 
AUr~pnUe have to rely much more hervily 
on private means to smooth fluduationa In 
household ~comc 
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'fbe duacome from the ICRISAT villw 
mdia. In 1975, a pcwl was dnwn from a 
nndan stratified run* of small> medium? 
md kgedzcd f d n g  and landless labow 
~ i n s r b ~ b r t y h o ~ d s  
were selected in ach village, 10 from each 
stnlum. The data source is described In 
Binswang~ and Jodha (1977) aad in p u t  
W e s  (Bins- 1977, Jodha 1981) in the 
EPW. Household data on plot cultivation, 
transactions, and labour market participa- 
tion, wages, &d employment w& collected 
by a resident investigator during 3 to 4 m e k  
p e r i o d r ~ n ~ o a ~ o t h e r ~ u l e b  
was updated annually 
Household income is estimated for nine 
cropping years from 1975-76 to 1983-84. 
Concepts and procedures used to estimate 
income are given in Singh and Asokan 
(1981). Income conceptually refers to net 
household income which represents returns 
to family labour, management, owned 
bullocks, capital, and land. Revrnues and ex- 
penses from both farm and non-farm 
activities were included in estimating net 
household income. Dowry and other large 
transactions pertaining to life-cycle events 
were excluded. 
The analysis relates to the 'continuous' 
cultivator households who remained in the 
panel from 1975-76 to 1983-84. For those 
households, information on fluctuations in 
income a summarised by the coefficient of 
variation of net household income. A CV 
is estimated for each household based on 9 
years of income data deflated by a village 
specific consumer price index. 
Any analysis of household income 
variability would be incomplete without 
placing the period of study into a climatic 
perspective. Based on data from rain gauge 
installed in the villages, the 9-year period of 
analysis was punctuated by good and bad 
ninfidi jva1-8. In Aurepall: there were four 
'bad' y#n when toml mud &fall dipped 
below- 80 per cent of normal. ln ~ h i n b r ,  
total anoud ninM rrlso wied considerably 
over the nine ywt Consecutive drought 
-in t ~ ~ n u d l s n s n l o - -  
betmen favourable rainfall yeuo in 1975-76 
and 1978-79. Concistent with the d d p t o r  
'rainfall r s s d l ,  inter-year pncipitation was 
less variable and higher in Kanzua than in 
the other two villages. All in all, the nine 
years represented a fair sampling of dry and 
wet rainfall events, but an exceptionally dry 
ye?, such a, 1W2-73 whose frequency 
Laledinsky termed "never in a 100 yem" 
when rainfall was only 25 per cnnt of 
normal, did not occur (Winsky, 1977). 
RISK BENEFl7S EMPIRICALLY 
Ib measunrisk benefits derived from psu- 
ticipating in a crop insurance programme, 
we focus on the most common crops grown 
in each village. Those crops include irrigated 
paddy in Aurcpalle and five dryland 
crops-kharif sorghum and castor in 
Aurepalle, rabi sorghum in Shirapur, and 
desi cotton and hybrid sorghum in Kanziira 
We include in the analysis those cultivators 
who grew the crop in at least five of the nine 
years. With the acception of hybrid sorghum 
in Kanzara, many of the sample farm 
households planted the crop, but in varying 
area, each year. 
Descriptive information on the house- 
holds cultivating the common crops is 
presented in a b l e  2. Several points arc worth 
mentioning. First, many of the so-called 
common crops were not actually that com- 
mon reflaring a diversified cropping pattern 
tmical of dryland agriculture in India's SAT. 
The most commoniillage cropping system 
is rabi sorghum in Shirapur which accounted 
for about 58 per cent of gross cropped area 
TABLE 3: SIMULATED RISK BENEFITS FROM PARTICIMINGIN ALTERNATIVECROP INSURANCE DESIGNS 
Crop 
Crop Insurance Design 
Village Homogeneous A m  Individual 
Mean Mean Pro- Mean Mean Pro- 
Reduction portional Reduction portional 
in Per cent Risk in Per cent Risk 
in House- Premium* in House- Premium* 
hold hold 
Income CV Income CV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (9 (6)  
Irrigated paddy Aurepalle 4.24 0.85 3.93 0.80 
Sorghum Auunpalle 0.58 0.11 0.56 0.09 
Castor Aurepalle 4.04 0.99 3 .05 0.64 
Sorghum Shirapur 1.10 0.32 1.66 0.25 
Deri cotton Kanzara -0.9Ib** 0.05 1.21 0.15 
Hybrid sorghum Kanura -0.64*** 0.10 -0.40°** 0.33 
Paddy sorghum, and 
castorb* Aurepalle 2.60 0.53 2.20 0.50 
Cotton and sorghum** Kanzara 1.55 OJ 5 1.65 0.18 
Notes Per cent of mean household income from 1975-76 to 1983-84. 
** For  household^ that planted at leest one crop in five or more years. 
*** Negative &as indicate that participation in the crop insurance design would have 
Increased the m& CV of household income. 
In the village Although hybrid sorghum is 
the second most common cropping system 
after desicotton in Kaura, it was planted 
on average to only about 8 per cent of gross 
cropped area. Secondly, mean household 
income CVs betmen 33 and 47 per cent mn- 
force the popular image of production 
uaccrtainty in dryland agriculture in,India's 
SAT (Still only 10 of the 81 continuous 
cultivator households had CVs e x c d i  50 
per cent.) We should also not be surprised 
that the CVs are higher in Aurepalle thrn 
in Shirapur where off-farm employment 
opportunities ue more ample or in Kanzam 
where the production environment is not M 
harsh. W y ,  yidd variability on avmw was 
an order of magnitude 3 to 5 times greater 
than price variability. Prices were mnarkably 
stable over the period of analysis. Such 
stability is essential for crop insurance to 
generate sizeable risk benefits. Unfortunately, 
as we shall soon see, there are several ingre- 
dients in the recipe 
To assess the range of risk benefits poten- 
tially offered by crop insurance, we in- 
vestigate two contrasting designs. One is an 
individual approach where the basis for both 
premia and indemnity assessment is each 
farmer's yield; the other is a homogeneous 
approach with indemnity claims and pmnia 
charges based on village yields. We assume 
75 per cent yield cowrage in both designs. 
Farmers are compensated when their yield 
falls below the 75 per cent Iml of either their 
mean yield (in the individual design) or the 
village average yield (in the homogeneous 
area approach). Compensated yields are 
multiplied by the same year's price to exploit 
the potential stabilising impact of negative 
yield price covariances. Indemnity payments 
are then added to household income net of 
break-wen premia costs. It is assumed that 
the government bears the full administrative 
costs of the programme. 
Our assessment is also based on the 
assumption that the household does not 
materially change its behaviour in response 
to the p~ogramme.~ Thus the simulated 
results in Table 3 show how much income 
stability could be achieved over and beyond 
whatever risk management alternatives the 
household availed itself of. 
Risk benefits from each design are 
measured in two ways. In columns (3) and 
(5) of 'hble 3, we present estimates of the 
mean per cent reduction in the CV of 
household income with participation in the 
crop insurance programme The estimates in 
columns (4) and (6) are more formally 
grounded in economic theory and reflect 
what a household would be willing to 
sacrifice in terms of iti mean income level 
to gain the reduction in household income 
variability derived from crop insurance. The 
risk benefit for each howhold is synonymous 
with the proportional risk premium which 
is calculated by multiplying one-half the dif- 
ference between the squared CVs with and 
without insurance by an index of risk aver- 
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lion called the relative risk avcrkion coeffi- 
cient. The d u e  of the latter is often mum- 
td to be 1.0 OJewbery and Stiglitz Ip81).5 
The proportional risk premium b aprased 
M a per cent of mean household income6 
The mults in Table 3 are not encoung- 
ins. For all common village crop, the risk 
benefits from crop insurance range from 
modest to negligible. Crop insurance is 
simply not an effective means to reduce 
income variability for the vast majority of 
farm houaehdds cultiwting the crop, most 
often grown in the study villages. Of the 
common cropping patterns, apparent risk 
benefits would be derived from i ~ u -  
castor and paddy in Arcprllc But insunnce 
would only reduce household income 
vuiability by 3 to 4 per cent; such a modest 
reduction would be worth only about one 
per cent of mean household incomc 
Some rirk benefits would also accrue to 
farmers participating in a multi-commodity 
crm insurance scheme in Aurepalle but even 
th& gain8 an small compu;d to a bench- 
modity crop insurance ue ku than 10 per 
cent of t h m  from perfect crop iacome 
strblliution. Single or multi-commodity 
crop insurance doesn't make much of 8 dent 
in cmp femue inruMlity which contributa 
proponionally more to household incow 
variability than any other major incamc 
source (Walker, Singh, Asokm, and 
Binrwsnser, 1983). 
I\vo other points are worth notlw about 
the utimates in Pble 3. Bccruse both 
designs offer on average ao little in the way 
of risk benefit8 m cuurot sry that an in- 
dividual approach is superior (in tarm of 
rirk benefits) to a homogenww area 8p 
proach. W can howem state that indem- 
nities paid are more equitably distributed 
with the individual approach. Some f u m m  
d v e d  relatively more indcmnitiea t h  
othen in a homogeneous area approach 
because vatiability in planted area did not 
coincide with the timing of indemnity 
payments. For euunple d fannm PI&- 
tine castor in AunpaUe would have received 
T b C ~ ~ d ~ ~ b w d O I l 8  
m e m a  rpgtorch. Income VuiabUty 
wasmeuurodfromthecontiauour~ 
tiwr of CVs. Would th outcome have kas 
morefpvounbktonopinwraccifvmwaursd 
a bounded rationallt~ framework in which 
risk benefits are & in dbcontinwu~ 
terms like disaster levdc of income and 
minimum probabllitkc? While t h m  am 
almost a limitler, number of thmhdd lcvdr 
of income and probabilities from which to 
choose, one intuitively appdna thPclhold 
concept is an incomc level below which the 
household is compelled to make a d i s t m  
sale of Iand. That disaster l e d  does not 
apply to the study villages because over the 
mark of perfect net crop -menue stabilisa- two to three times more in indemnities than lost 40 yeon dlstres~ sales of land have been 
tion. If net c r o ~  revenue could be stabilid they prid in premir; others took in much loss rare Morcowt, land sales were not bunched 
at its mean l&l over the nine ywn, the risk 
benefita could be sizcable nndng from a 62 
OM cent reduction in household Income CV 
r 
for paddy cultivators in Aurepalle to a 30 
per cent decrease for cotton growers in 
Kanzam. When m eltimate and compare 
mean proportional rtrk premia from perfect 
crop nvenue stabilisation with those from 
the simulated crop insurance designs in 
columna (4) and (6) in Table 3, we find in 
genenf bt enrolling in the simulated crop 
imu& schemes aploiu relatively little of 
the potential risk benefits derived from 
perfect crop revenue stabllisation. The mean 
proportional risk pmnium for multiple 
commodity crop inlunnce in Aurepalle ip 
about 9 per cent of the estlmated mean pro- 
portional risk pmnium from perfect crop 
revenue stabilisation. Multiple crop 
Insurance in Kuurn only t a p  about 5 per 
m t  of those potential risk benefits. With 
the accption of cutor in Aunprlle (at 17 
per cant), the risk benefits from single com- 
than they paid out because t h y  sowed 
relatidy little am of the crop in those years 
when indemnities werc triggered by low 
village mean yields and planted more area 
to the crop in the more productive yurs 
when indemnitieo were not paid. In principk 
an individual approach doesn't suffer from 
such inequalities because the p r o g h m e  is 
tailored to the yield history of each farmer 
so that over time pmnia can be adjusted to 
indemnities paid The scope for such tailor- 
ing is one reason why crop insurance prac- 
titioners often prefer the individual 
approach. 
The my modest reductions in income 
CVs in Table 3 indicate that few farmers 
would be willing to participate in the alter- 
native crop insurance designs. One would 
have to assume much higher levels of rirk 
aversion, far surpassing those commonly 
assumed in the literature, to generate 
aipllficmtly higher levels of participation, 
Additionrlly. if ~UIIIGIS hrd to ku the rd- 
in adverse rainfall ycan augperting that 
household rirk adjustdrent was at least 
minimally effective in dealinn with cowlrtc 
weather ?irk (Cain, 1981). cven during the 
mas~ive 1971-73 drought in Western 
Mahamshtn few households in Shim~ur 
parted with heir Iand. 
Rather than iplore the question posed 
earlier in this W o n ,  m did look at one 
simple bounded rationality mnt ,  the pro- 
bability that 8 household would suffer a 
shortfall in income (in r t  least one of nine 
years) below SO per cent of its median 
incomc Many eultivrron putlcululy those 
in households in Aumpalle fell into the 
shortfall category. Could putidpation in 
crop iluurance htve ~ m e n t e d  them from 
suffering a such shup shortfall in income? 
The data in the last column of Pble 4 sun- 
g a t  that crop insunncc would hale ma& 
my little diffcnncc This result is consis- 
tent with the nrliution that yidd risk was 
only one of Kvenl facton cwtributim to 
shortfalls in household income Wk,  
TABU 4 CROP INSUUNCE AND SHORTEUU w Houanols, Iwue Singh, Asokan and Biarwan#cr, 1963). 
~umkt or s h ~ r t t ~ ~  ~owchddr* AREA VARIABILITY AND' cov~ l l r n  
Crop Village Without With Crop Imrance SOURCES OF R~SK 
&P ~ o m ~ u s  Individual ~ d o e M ' t c r 0 p ~ i n p d a l u l d  
7 
InmJfallce - m g n  m@l schemes bored on a h o m g b ~  u#rp- 
tr@kd prddy AunplUe 7 4 4 proach in particular gencnta larger risk 
W u m  ~urrpruc 8 8 8 benefits? The answer is cltu-too many 
bwr Aunpllle 12 9 II necessary and somethy con- condl- 
orlhm Shirapur 7 3 4 tions have to be satisfied. One way to point 
bdsllcotton I<latM 5 6 6 outthosecondit&msktoOtttUn,thtlQtlYrC 
lybdd sorghum K r a m  6 s 6 ofancnvironmentcondudwtofinn~ 
rQdy corshum, md 
&or kvqrrlle 12 10 ~n#ivinosiOaiffculCrDJrkadlUftacg 
ottoaandror~um Wan 6 6 6 churctcrlwa bY 12 j htvulcc The ldcd W n  wotlld be f d b d w  
- 4  t k l i n s d u a h o u c q ~ l d n r b l & l a o n e o r m o n ~ ~ ~ ~ l r r r l l & t h a  
$0 per cent of iu modkn income from 1975-76 to US%& (a@ text). Tbm w, 
numberof cbortWhowehoWs~bYcropmdi(dnshcktblld~aT, 
wf, 
w 
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(3) output prices should be stable to ensure 
'that price variability does not unduly 
influence m n u e  vanability directly or 
indirectly through fluctuations in areas; 
(4) crop supply should not depend heavily 
on amclimatic conditions so that the 
link between weather-induced fluctua- 
tions in area and crop income could be 
broken; and 
(5) yields from the insured crops should be 
acposed'to at most a few and not multi- 
ple sources of risk so that indemnity 
assessment based on a homogeneous 
area approach could be efficient in 
stabilising income for most farmers in 
the region. 
The first three conditions are self-evident 
and do not warrant further comment. Con- 
ditioris (4) and (5) are more subtle. Their 
understanding is important because regions 
where (4) obtains are unlikely to overlap with 
geographic areas where (5) is satisfied. 
Condition (4) addresses area variability 
which severely erodes the capacity of crop 
insurance to generate risk benefits in uncer- 
tain dryland production environments. 
When we calculate the coefficient of varia- 
tion of area sown for each household like 
we did for yields and prices in Table 2, we 
find that mean area variability exceeds mean 
yield variability for each common cropping 
system. 
A large share of area variability in dryland 
agricultl~re stems from decisions taken by 
farmers to cope with agroclimatic risk. 
Examples are not hard to find in India's SAT. 
Planned area for a crop often deviates 
markedly from actual area sown. Ana!ysis 
of data from SAT districts suggests that 
relatively more area is planted to hardier 
coarse grains in low railifall years (Bapna, 
at 91.1984). In the study villages, both castor 
in Aurepalle and post-rainy season sorghum 
in Shirapur are planted wherr farmers have 
some information on rainfall during the start 
of the cropping year. When the monsoon is 
late in Aurepalle, the potential for shootfly 
to inflict yield losses on sorghum is greater 
and farmers respond by substituting castor 
for sorghum. As a consequence of early 
season drought in 1977-78 the average area 
sown to local sorghum was halved while 
mean castor area increased by about 40 per 
cent. Similarly, in Shirapur farmers react to 
low rainfall years by planting less area to 
post-rainy season sorghum which is grown 
on residual moisture. 
Perhaps the most poignant example of 
area variability in dryland agricultwe occurs 
in the hard rock production regions where 
area sown depends on surface water col- 
lected in tanks and on groundwater stored 
in dug w e k  If not enough water is available, 
ciopo, u s d y  paddy, are often not planted. 
Ramaswemy et afs (1986) findin0 that paddy 
Wdr in their North Arcot study villagesin 
t dry early 1980s in. 'lfimil Nadu did not 
~ u k c d l y  from yields in normal years t 
that drought oftm manifests itself 
in reductions in area more than in shortfrlls 
in yield.' 
To address m a  variability in dryland 
~ r i cu l tu re  with crop insurance, one needs 
to a tcnd Dandekar's recommendation that 
the basis for indemnity payments with a 
homogeneous area approach should be a 
multi-crop yield index. That recommenda- 
tion should be widened to cover both yield 
and area components. To derive such a 
multi-commodity production index, which 
is actuarily sound and administratively feapi- 
ble, would be a challenging, evendaunting, 
task. 
Subsidised crop insurance programmes 
that have tried to c o ~ e  with area variabilitv 
by insuring failed pianlings or a-post ar& 
sown have been fraught with moral hazard 
probelms and have recorded high loss ratios. 
The US crop insurance programme in the 
early 1940s was one such case (Gardner and 
Kramer, 1986). For crop insurance to yield 
risk benefits, planned m a ,  which is the basis 
for insurance, should coincide reasonably 
well with actual area sown to the insured 
crop. 
In other words, condition (4) says that 
crop insurance will work better in the more 
stable production regions where area varia- 
bility caused by c!imatic risk is less. Condi- 
tion (5) implies the opposite. In those more 
assured production environments, there is 
not a dominant or monolithic source of risk 
like drought that affects crop yields in most 
farmers' fields in roughly the same way 
within the same cropping, year, i e, in the 
more assured production regions, the sources 
of risk are potentially less covariate because 
biotic stresses like insect pests and disease 
play a more prominant role. Less covariate 
sources of risk means that indemnities based 
on a homogeneous area approach will not 
stabilise and in some cases may even 
destabilise income (Roumasett, 1979). For 
example, for about 35 per cent of the desi 
cotton growers, from the respondent 
households in Kanzara, individual farmers' 
yields were inversely correlated with average 
yields within the same villane from 1975-76 
io 1980-81 (Walker and - ~ o d h a ,  1986). 
Moreover, if the sources of risk are not that 
covariate within the homogeneous regions, 
farmers will rarely be indemnified. 
Extending the same line of reasoning with 
regard to a multi-commodity crop insurance 
schemes, if the sources of risk are not that 
covariate across crops then farmers can self 
insure through croo diversification. In the 
more rainfafi assured Akola region, where 
production risk arises from several physical 
and biotic stresses, crop diversification is 
effective in significantly reducing crop 
income variability (Walker, Singh. and 
Jodha, 1983). In thb more rainfall unreliable 
Mahabubnagar and Sholapur regions, when 
production risk stems mainly froni a single 
covariate source of risk-drought-, mow 
diversified holdings have about the same 
level of crop income variability as less diver- 
sified fumr. Thaefom abmcc of covrriate 
risks in the more stable production en- 
vironments has two implications for crop in- 
surance based on a homogeneous area ap- 
praach. (I) the timing of indemnities will not 
coincide well with years of low crop income 
for some (and most likely many) farmers in 
the region, and (2) the effectiveness of crop 
diversification will reduce the demand for 
multi-commodity crop insurance. 
Conditions (4) and (5) clearly conflict. Ib 
satisfy (4) we need relatively assured produc- 
tion rrgions. Ib meet (S), we require drought- 
prone regions. Suppose we map those five 
necessary conditions and delineate geo- 
graphic areas where they are satisfied in 
India's Semi-Arid Ropics. We believe that 
the intersecting set either in terms of 
geographic area or number of households 
would be very small. 
RAINFALL 017'ERIES 
If crop insurance does not deliver the 
goods in terms of risk benefits, what other 
institutional alternatives are available? Rain- 
fall lotteries are one alternative that hold 
much more promise than crop insurance as 
an institutional means to cost effectively 
diminish rural household income variability 
in India's SAT. Rainfall lotteries or insurance 
are not a new or novel idea (Bardsley et 01, 
1984) but to our knowledge there are few if 
aly cases where they have been tried though 
private or public sector finance. 
Rainfall lotteries could be patterned along 
the lines suggested by the Australian 
Industries Assistance Commission in their 
1978 report on Rural Income Fluctuations 
(Lloyd and Mauldon, 1986). Rainfall for the 
monsoon season or even for a critical month 
in the season could be divided into 5 or 10 
intervals representing discrete events. 
Households would be free to buy lottery 
tickets on those events at the start of the 
rainy season. Payments would be based on 
rainfall data from the nearest rain gauge 
usually located in a taluka or tehsil head- 
quarters. Over time the programme could 
extend its coverage by installing rain gauges 
in neighbouring villages. If participants felt 
that rainfall in their fields and/or village did 
not accord well with rainfall at the nearest 
station they would be free to spread their risk 
by purchasing tickets on rainfall in several 
nearby sta'tions. 
Rainfall lotteries offer several advantages 
over crop insurance in India's SAT. They 
would be a fair betting system and (as en- 
visaged by Dandekar (1976) for crop in- 
surance) would be open to all households in 
the village. If landless labour households felt 
the demand for their labour was markedly 
reduced in low rainfall years, they coilid 
hedge their future labour income by pur- 
chasing tickets on the lowest or what they 
perceived to be the most adverse rainfall 
events. 
A lottery format would also allow farmers 
to protect their income from non-linearities 
between rainfall and yield. Too much rain 
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is oftm as damaging to crop income in the 
Semi-Arid 'Ifopics as too little rain. With 
rainfall lotteries, farmers could guard against 
unfavourable events associated with or too 
little too much rainfall. 
Although rainfall is more covariate acrgds 
space than yield, the insurer would likely be 
less exposed to risk because, with both 
hedgers and speculators in the market, off- 
setting positions would be held. Aslo, in a 
country as large as India, the monsoon is 
not that covariate across regions. In most 
years, rainfall is high in some regions, low 
in others. The geographic coverage for 
insuring rainfall would be much broader 
than for insuring yields of specific crops 
which are planted in well-defined regions. 
Both the lottery format and the more exten- 
sive geographic coverage should ensure that 
a rainfall insurer would be less exposed to 
risk of catastrophic loss in India's SAT than 
a crop insurer. The size of the country makes 
rainfall lotteries a much more attractive 
alternative in lndia than in smaller countries 
of the Semi-Arid ltopics. 
Rainfall appears to be more removed from 
income than yield: however, in the lower and 
more variable rainfall dryland agricultural 
regions, rainfall may be a sounder basis for 
measuring fluctuations in crop revenues than 
yield. In those regions, rainfall should be 
positively covariate with cropped area. 
Deviations from normal rainfall at sowing 
also induce farmers to plant less remunerative 
crops. Hence, in the dryer less assured 
regions, rainfall may expldn more of the 
variation in crop revenue variability through 
its p i n e d  effect on area and yield 
varia ility than the pure impact of yield 
variability. 
A number of other points favour rainfall 
lotteries over crop insurance. In principle, 
rainfall is much more observable than yield 
and should be easier to measurc Participants 
in a self-funded rainfall lottery should be in 
a much better position to agm on what rain- 
fall events obtained compared to farmers 
enrolled in a crop insurance programme 
which relies on yield assessments based on 
area sampling frames. Rainfall lotteries 
should also be relativelv f m  from incentive 
a11 villagers collude. bet on the rrme event, 
and bribe oMcids to report fraudulant rain- 
fall data so that that event is obtained. But 
such abnormal participant behaviour could 
be easily spotted at the start of the rainy 
season. When detected, such behaviour 
would lead to cancelling of the lottery. 
lnconsistmt reporting would also stand out 
during the monitoring of daily rainfall data 
generated in a regional network of rain 
gauges. 
Like crop insurance, administration of 
rainfall insurance would very much entail a 
learning by doing process ideally with a 
small start in geographically dispersed 
regions. The idea of rainfall lotteries may 
have have enough merit to be carried out 
experimentally. Primary interest in the 
experiment would centre on the demand for 
insurance as reflected by the incidence and 
characteristics of participants who take 
hedging positions by purchasing tickets on 
adverse rainfall events. 
Nevertheless, we are not optimistic that 
participation in a rainfall lottery would 
generate sizeable risk benefits for par- 
ticipants. Of the three study villages, only 
in Shirapur was total rainfall significantly 
correlated with mean village net household 
income owr the nine-year period of analysis. 
Also, rural public relief measures are 
usually triggered on rainfall assessments 
thereby making rainfall-based insurance (to 
some extent) redundant. Demand for such 
insurance would be particularly reduced in 
regions where politicians are quick to appeal 
for state and Centre assistance at the 
slightest indication that the monsoon is 
capricious (Morris. 1974). 
Most readers of the EPW are aware of the 
strengths and weaknesses of public works 
programmes. In particular, Maharashtra's 
ambitious Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(EGS) has been evaluated from several 
perspectives in past articles in the EPW 
(Dandekar and Sathe, 1980. MHJ, 1980. and 
MHJ, I982 only represents a sampling). 
Nonetheless, few analysts have focused their 
attention on the elusive issue of risk benefits. 
problems related to *moral hazard and 
adverse selection. They should also be ad- 
ministratively cheaper than crop insurance 
Lastly, the actuarial basis for rainfall 
insurance is much firmer than for crop 
insurance. Rainfall records are extensive 
throughout much of lndia. 
Rainfall lotteries also share some of the 
problems of crop insurance Participation by 
the poorest households could be severely 
limited or m n  curtailed by liquidity con- 
straints. Questions of how and when to col- 
lect b a s  and distribute winnings would have 
to be resolved. Insmlling a rain guage in 
every village would maximise demand for 
rainfall insurmw. but this would also lead 
to increased scope to tamper with rainfall 
data. One could imagine a situation where 
that is, how effective has the EGS been in 
smoothing income variability of potential 
participants. 
Evidence on inter-year fluctuations in par- 
ticipation rates suggests that the EGS has 
been effective in some localities hit by 
drought and other events that adversely 
affect production. The ability of the scheme 
to respond in times of need is supported by 
the .following examples: 
. . . cultivators in Western Maharashtra and 
Marathwada (centnl dislricts) flocked to 
EGS sites aher sowing operations were 
disrupted by lengthy dry spells durinp the 
1979 monsoon; attendance rose sharply and 
mnaincd high in Vidarbha ( a w n  portion 
of the state) when August floo- destroyed 
the paddy crop in many locpIIti(x Similuly, 
a poor rabi crop due to iluuffkimt 4 
moistm was ntlfftsd in ununully hi& E 
attendance during April-July 198% flood 
in Mmthwnda multcd in relatively high p 
ticipation levels from August 1983 onwr 
(Lieberman, 1984, p 7). 
More quantitatiw although frpsmente 
evidence, on the potential for flexible, l a  
public-works p r o w e s  like the EOS 
generate risk benefits comes from the stuc 
villages. That evidence is based on compt 
ing lmls  of household income @ability 
drought prone Shirapur and Aurepall 
Landless labour households that relic 
almost entirely on earnings in the dai 
agricultural labour market in Shirapur ar 
Kanzara, where the EGS operated sin( 
1977, had about 50 per cent less variab 
income streams than those in Aurepall~ 
where rural public work opportunities we! 
not locally available. Only in Shirapur wa 
labour's share in income inversely an 
significantly associated with the CV of nc 
household income, suggesting that a con 
siderable number of the respondent house 
holds relied on off-farm earning oppor 
tunities to smooth fluctuations in income 
But these results should be interpreted wit1 
caution because there are only 8-9 house 
holds in each village by farm-size category 
Moreover, differences in village ecologie! 
other than the availability of rural public. 
works employment and other off-farm 
employment opportunities also conditioned 
the degree to which shortfalls in income 
could be compensated for by labour market 
earnings. 
Still, and despite widely acknowledged 
shortcomings, a public works programme 
like the EGS is the best institutional bet to 
protect a large number of poor rural 
households from the ravages of income 
variability in India's Semihrid 'Ropics. No 
other institutional alternative can as cost 
effectively select for those in need (Jadha, 
1978). Evaluations that do not account for 
the size of risk benefits or thqt do not con- 
sider the opportunity cost of generating such 
benefits via other institutional means do not 
do justice to such schemes. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
We conclude by discussing some recom- 
mendations, frequently mentioned in the 
popular literature, on how to overcome the 
problem of low farmer participation in 
voluntary insurance programmes. Some 
individuals advocate compulsory crop 
insurance. If crop insurance is administeml 
as crop-credit insurance, making crop in- 
surance compulsory increases the cost of 
credit to clients who would not haw volun- 
tarily purchased insurance Usurlly sucb 
farmers haw greater risk b e e  capacity 
and an some of the better clients of the 
institutional lending agency. Credit f b m  
other institutional and private sources will 
become more attractive to tbcm. The pro- 
bkm of IdvrIsC Kkcti08 h csmgiauy 
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ransferred from the insurer to the credit 
aency which will lose some of their better 
:tients to other formal and infonnal sources 
Binauangcr, 1986). As long as cmp insurance 
s linked to credit, voluntary participation 
s only way to combat adverse selection to 
he credit agency. 
Another way to entice more farmers to 
mrticipate would be to increase the subsidy 
mntent of the programme. But subsidies are 
iifficult to justify on either efficiency or 
quity grounds. We haw already shown that 
,isk benefits are likely to be negligible. 
Increased transfer benefits occasioned by 
non subsidies would accrue dispropor- 
:ionatcly to richer cultivator households who 
rely mon heavily on crop revenue as a soum 
3f income and who also have greater access 
lo subsidised institutional credit (Von 
Pischke, Adams, and Donald, 1983). 
Crop insurance in India's SAT should be 
reen for what it is a regressive and ineffec- 
tive stabilisation policy. Our results support 
the main conclusion of the 1971 Expert 
Committn chaired by Dharm Narain. "The 
Expert Committee, therefore, concluded that 
in the context of paucity of resources for 
planned development, a recurring expen- 
diture on the administration of [the] crop 
insurance scheme, is not preferable to the 
direct utilisation of funds for raising 
agricultural productivity and reducing crop 
yield variability" (as cited in Agarwal, 1980, 
P 100). 
Notes 
[We thank seminar partinpants at Australia Na- 
tional University, Cornell University, the Inter 
models am the stmdard tools used to 
nrluatc the size of M and tmnafa benetits. 
T h w  are often favoured by students in PhD 
thesis meurh  (Djojq 1983 and Falatoon- 
d e n ,  1983). While such models haw their 
time and place, they haw acrious shoncom- 
ings in coming to grip with the Isue of risk 
benefits. They u r d y  rdy on w t e  yidd 
data which may sme ly  undacrtimatc yield 
risk at the fann level. They cannot readily 
mimic complex hourchdd mporws, such qa 
migration and increased labour market par- 
ticipation, to steep rhortfills in welfare Nor 
can issues like within-season area adjust- 
ments in response to emerging agroclimatic 
information be readily addressed with such 
approaches. 
3 From 1979-84, the EOS accounted for about 
IS and 24 per cent of men's and women's 
labour employment (including own farm 
work) in Shirapur. Comparable figures for 
Kanzara were 13 and 5 per cent. 
4 That assumption would not hold for some 
crops and locations. The assumption is 
strongest for Kanzara where opportunities 
for diversification are much greater than in 
Shirapur and Aurepallc. In Kanzara, yields 
in and revenues from hybrid sorghum pro- 
duction are considerably more variable than 
those in competing cotton intercropping 
systems. If yield variability were reduced in 
hybrid sorghum, farmers would shift some 
of their cotton area into hybrid sorghum pro- 
duction (Walker and Subba Rao, 1982). 
Nonetheless, because the demand for hybrid 
sorghum is wry price inelaati~ those transfer 
benefits would be short-lived and ultimately 
would end up in the hands of consumers. 
5 To some extent. Ncwbery and Stiglitz based 
their choice of 1.00 on experimental 
evidence from the ICRISAT study villages 
(Binswurger, 1981). From the experimental 
nsults, mimates for partial risk wemion are 
on a much firmer footing than those for 
rclatiw risk aversion. 
6 The formula derived by Nmbery and Stiglitz 
to estimate the proportional risk premium 
is not mathematically accurate (Kanbur, 
1984), but, becauae we do not address the 
issue of transfer benefits, their derivation is 
correct for our application. 
7 The role of area variability has not gone un- 
noticed by economic historians. McAplin 
(1983) found that year-to-year changes in 
acreage planted contributed the lion's share 
to variation in an index she constructed to 
measure the quality of the agricultural year 
in the erstwhile Bombay Presidency from 
1886-87 to 1919-20. 
References 
Agarwal, A K, 1980, 'Agricultural Crop In- 
surance in India', Pages 99-113 in Crop In- 
surance for Asian Countries", (Lee, C Y ed). 
Bangkok, Thailand: FA0 Regional Office 
for Asia and the Pacific. 
Bapna, S L. Binswanger. H P and Quizon, 
J B 1984, 'Systems of Output Supply and 
Factor Demand Equations for Semi-Arid 
Tropical India'. Indran Journal o j  
Agricultuml Economics, 39 (2): 179-202. 
Bardslcy, P, Abey, A and Davenport, S, 1984, 
'The Economics of Insuring Crops against 
Drought, Austmlcm Journal of Agricultuml 
Economics, 28 (I): 1-14. 
Bassoco, L M, Cartas. C, and Norton, R D, 
1986, 'Sectoral Analysis of the Benefits of 
Subsidised Insurance in Mexico', Pages 
IM142 in "Crop Insurance for Agricultuml 
Development: Issues and Experience" 
IHazell. P. Pomareda. C. and Valdes. A. 
E Jagadeesh for calculating the crop insurance 
simulations.] 
I Anyone who believes that crop insurance can 
be used as a tool to transfer modern 
technology packages should read 
Choudhary's (1977) evaluation of the crop 
insurance scheme for hybrid-4 cotton in 
Gujarat. The scheme is illustrative of what 
can happen when optimal technology is 
packag;d for extension to farmers and m a s  
subo~timal field conditions. That experience 
"wa; not very encouraging for theGtnerd 
Insurance Corporation since it had to shell 
out in the form of indemnity nearly eleven 
tima the amount it collected as premiums" 
(Agarwal. 1980, p Ill). Choudhary con- 
cluded that "such a scheme would be more 
suitable whae production is slablc pmnnial 
irrigation sources uc in existence, and 
fanners have assured access to irrigation 
facilities" (p 7). Such a protected environ- 
w t  would dw wipe out any potential 
pryoff, in the kfm of risk benefits, from 
a6p iar-ce 
the Iak Steln Rokkan and Derek W Umln 
ECONOMY, TERRITORY, IDENTITY 
Polltlcs of West European Per~pher~es 
HOW can we vlsual~ze lnteractlons between the central and per~pheral areas of Europe? 
Retalnlng the keynotes of drafts by the late Stem Rokkan, Urwln considers the bas~c on. 
cepts of centre and per~phery By extend~ng them well beyond terr~torlal dms~ons, he 
n able to clar~fy polltlcal relatronsh~ps, as well as econornlc and cultural Impacts 
Thls s an amb~t~ous work that uses three established approaches to systematize our 
understanding of per~pher~es the (hlstorral) polltlcal geography of centre-bu~ld~ng and 
pollt~cal demarcat~on, the pol~t~cal economy of terrltorlsl lntegrat~on or fragmentdt~on, and 
the pol~t~cal ~ x ~ o l o g y  of the rnalntenance of the ldentlty and pollt~cal mob~l~sat~on 
SAGE PUBLICATIONS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED 
Post Box 421 5, New Delhi 1 10048 
as ) ,  Ilrltimorr, USA: The Johnr Hopkina 
Uniwnity Pms. 
bwanger,  H P, 1979, 'R&k Attltuda of Runl 
Households in SemiArid m p i d  India', 
Economic and Polltical Wlckly, 12: 
A49-A62 . 
Bimwanmm H P. 1986, 'Risk Awnion. Col- 
la ted  Requirementh and the Markets for 
Credit and lnrunna in Runl A m :  Rrec 
67-87 in "Crop Inrumce for ~ g r i c u l t h  
Developmmt: Lsues and Experiencd' 
( H d ,  P, Pomada, C, and Vddes, A, 
eds), Baltimore, USA: The Johns Hopktns 
University Pres~. 
Binswmger, H P, and Jodha, N S, 1978, 
uManual of Instruction8 for Economic In. 
vcatiptors in ICRISAT1r Village L m l  
Studies", Vol 11. Resource Management 
Pmpmm, Bconomicd Gmun hlanchm, 
P 0 502 324. India: International Crops 
Racvch ~m&ute for the Semi-Arid Ttoph 
(ICRISAT) (limited distribution). 
~ h o u d h u ~ ,  K M, 1977, "4P ~ l a n : . ~ r o p  In.
sumce Scheme for Hybrid-4 Cotton in 
Gujamt", Agro-economic R e ~ u ~ h  Centre, 
Sardar Patel University, Vallabh 
Vidyanagu, Gujarat. 
Dandekrr, V M, 1976, "Crop Insurance in 
India", Economic and &li~ical Weekly, 11 
(26): A6l-A 80. 
Dmdekar, V M, 1985 "Crop Inaunnce in 
India: A Review 1976-77 to 1984-85': 
Qnomlc and R~lfiicul Weekly, 20 (25.26): 
A46-A59. 
Dandeku, K and Satk M, 1980, 'Employment 
Gumtee Scheme and Food for Work Pro- 
gramme': Economrc and Political Wcckly, 
15 (IS): 707-713. 
Djogo, A, 1983. "Risk Management Strategies 
in F mine: The Role of FederPl Crop In- 
ce", PhD thesis, The Ohio State -4 Univerrity, Colombus, Ohio, USA, 151 pp. 
Falatoonuden, H, 1983, "An Analysis of the 
Role of huturcs Markets and Federal Crop 
Insurance in Risk Management", PhD 
thesis, Rnas A and M Uniwnity, College 
Station, 'Rxrs, USA, 248 pp. 
Gudner, B L and Karmu, R A, 1986, 'Ex- 
perience with Crop Insurance Programmes 
in the United States', Pages 195-222 in 
"Crop Insurance for Agricultural Develop- 
ment: Issues and Experience" (Huell. P. 
Pomareda, C, and Valdes, A, eds). 
Bdtimow USA: The Johns Hopkins 
Uniwnity Prcsa. 
Hwll ,  P B R, and Valdes, A, 1984, 'Choos- 
ing the Right Role for Crop In~umce', 
C-, I7 (3): 17-20. 
Jodha, N S, 1978, 'Effwtiwness of Farmers' 
Adjustments to Risk: Economic and 
hlitical Weekly, 13 (25): A38A48. 
m a ,  N S, 1981, 'Agricultural Rnanty: Fresh 
Evidence from Dryland Areas in India', 
Eeonomlc and Political lclnkly. 16 (52): 
A 118-A 128 
Kanbur, S M R. 1984, 'How to Andy= Com- 
modity Price Stabilisation? A Review 
Article', Odord Economic Ibpm 36: 
336-358. 
Lieberman, S S, 1984, 'Mahulshtraf Emplay- 
ment Guarantee Scheme: A C u c  Study of 
an Employment Securfty R o g m ~ n e  in m 
Indian State', Presented 8t the Conferem 
on "Fopulation Growth and hbsur Ab- 
sorption l a  the Developing Wotld, 
1%CL3ooO1: July 1 4  1984, BaU4b Italy. 
tbyd, A 0. and hhuldon, R 0, 1981, 
'Agdcultuni 1-y md A k f # W W  
Oowrnment h l i c h  The Aurtnlirn Ex- 
p a i d ,  h g a  195-177 in "Cmp Innurncs 
for AOrlcultunl Development: Iuum m d  
perimce" (Hwll, P, Pornare&, C, m d  % du, A 48). Ealtimon, USA: RK Johns 
Hopkinr Uniwnity Pmr. 
McAJpin, M 8,1983, "Subject to Funinc: Food 
Crirer and Economic Chanaec in Wte rn  
India, IBd0.1920", Princeton, New Jmcy: 
Princaon Upiwsity Press. 
MHJ, 1980, 'Employment Guuantcc: An 
Evrludon', h n o m i c  and A d i l h l  W l y ,  
15 (49): 2043945. 
MHJ, 1982, 'Who Ryr for and Who Gains 
from EOS', 6conomic andPoIi~kvrl W&, 
17 (32). 1226-1228. 
de Rezende topa ,  MI and U t e  do Siva Dias, 
0, 1986. 'The Brazilian Experience with 
Crop Insurance Propunme, in "Crop In- 
surance for Agricultunl Development: 
Issuer m d  Experience" (Hazell, P. 
Pomareda, C, and Valdes, A eds). 
Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins 
Univesity Press. 
Morris, M D, 1974, 'What Is Famine?: 
Economic and Pbll~icul Week@, 9 (44): 
1855-1864. 
Nmbery, D M G, and Stiglitz, J E,1981, "The 
Theory of Price Stabilisation: A Study in 
the Economics of Risk", Oxford: Claren- 
don Press. 
Nieuwoldt. W L, and Bullock, J B, 1985, 'The 
Demand for Crop Insurance1, paper 
pnsentcd at the 19th International Congress 
of Agricultural Economists, August 26- 
-L 1977,"Alnrir)alttonn@~UP: 
flnWItd Budnew The Wrlrlnl, of Wf 
Wjinsky", Nm' R& Oxford Uahmky 
Reu. 
Wkw, 0 L, 1M2, 'AuWu Rwar in 
Evrlutinz Crop ~ n m m n d  kacoted u 
theAAWSympodumonCropInnmece, 
Augurt 1962, Department of Agricultunl 
Economia Oklahoma Sute Unimritv: 
Wb, T $ and Jodhr, N $1985, 'How Small 
h n  Houuholds Adapt to Risk: pages 
17-34 in "Crop Insunnce for Agricultunl 
Dcvelopmcnt: Issues and Experience" 
(HuIcU, P, Pomuedr, C, a d  Wdcr, A, 
cda), BaItimow USA: The Johns Hopkins 
unimrity P a .  
Walker, T S, and Subba Rao, K V, 1982, "Rlrk 
and the Choice of Cropping Systcmr 
Hybrid Sorghum and Cotton in the Akola 
Region of Central Peninsular India", 
Economic Programme Progws Report No 
43, Patmcheru, AP 502 324, India: Inter- 
national Crop Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics (limited d~stribution). 
Walker, T S, Singh, R P, and Jodha, N $ 1983, 
"Dimensions of Farm-Lcvel Diversification 
in the Semi-Arid 'lkopics of Rural South 
India". Economics Plogramme Progress 
Report no 51, Patancheru, A P, 502 324, 
India: International Crops Research In- 
stitute for the Semi-Arid 'kopics (limited 
distribution). 
Walker T S, Singh. R P, Asakan. M, and 
Binswanger, H P, 1983, "Fluctuations in In- 
Septmber 4, 1985, Mdaga, Spain. come in %se V i  of Peninsular India': 
Ramaswamy, C, Hazell, P, Wa8o~alan, V, and ICRISAT Economics Prouamme Rolncss 
Aiyasamy, P K 1986, '~h&es in Paddy 
lkhnology, Input Use, and Returns: paper 
presented at the IFPRI/TNAU work~hop 
on Gravth Linkages, February 14-16,1986, 
Ootacamund, India. 
Roumasset, J A, 1978, 'The Case against Crop 
Insurance in the Developing Countries', 
Phrlippine Review of Business and 
Economics, March: 87.107. 
Report No 57, Patancheh, AP, ~ ~ 1 2 4 ,  
India. International Crops Research In- 
stitute for the Semi-Arid Tkopics, (limited 
distribution). 
Von Pischkc, J D, Adams, D W, and Donald, 
G, 1983, "Rural Financial Markets in 
Developing Countries", Baltimore, 
Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
~ o m ~ u l s l v s  f e e h ~ ~ l a B y  explores the the reality. Other essays explore how 
ways in which computers confront computers become a 'defining 
users as a cultural force, as both tool technology' in the general culture. 
and master. RdM Science Serb w.18 
Three case studies - of scbods, higher 2 4 . ~ 6 6 l r o m  
educaUon and the artif- hs6 AamMon Books, 
industry - canWths rMo# with, 26 Freewow M, london N7. 
